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ADDRESSING INTERSTATE
GROUND WATER OWNERSHIP:
MISSISSIPPI V. TENNESSEE
ALEC SWEET*

INTRODUCTION
“Whiskey is for drinking; water is for fighting over.”1
Contemporaneous with significant climate change and heightened
environmental concerns, the Supreme Court has seen an increasing
number of water-related lawsuits between states. These lawsuits include
disputes over water storage and water compacts as well as disputes over
water usage affecting aquaculture.2 Scientists predict that in the future,
the United States could face rising temperatures, droughts, and natural
disasters.3 If states cannot cooperate to conserve the water they share,
these catastrophes could cause immense suffering and numerous
conflicts between states.4 The Supreme Court needs a consistent
Copyright @ 2022 Alec Sweet
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2023, B.A, Pomona College, 2020. I would
like to thank my family and friends for all of their support during my educational journey. I would
also like to thank everyone on my editorial team for their hard work on this piece.
1. Ted Poe, Whiskey is for drinking, water is for fighting, THE HILL (May 5, 2018),
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/387545-whiskey-is-for-drinking-water-isfor-fighting.
2. See Texas v. New Mexico, 141 S. Ct. 509 (2020) (disputing who is responsible for stored
water that evaporated under the Pecos River Compact); Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502 (2018)
(alleging Georgia’s water usage hurt Florida’s harvesting of oysters); See also Ellen M. Gilmer &
Jennifer Kay, Water Wars at the Supreme Court: ‘It’s Only Going to Get Worse’, BLOOMBERG L.
(Sept. 17, 2020 1:16 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/water-warsat-the-supreme-court-its-only-going-to-get-worse.
3. D. Wuebbles et al., How Will Climate Change Affect the United States in Decades to
Come?, EOS (Nov. 3, 2017), https://eos.org/features/how-will-climate-change-affect-the-unitedstates-in-decades-to-come.
4. See e.g., Tia Ghose, Water Woes: Firefighters Get Creative to Douse Flames in California,
LIVE SCI. (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.livescience.com/52302-alifornia-drought-reducing-waterfirefighting.html (explaining how firefighters in California are struggling to fight wildfires because
of the scarce water supply); Henry Fountain, In a First, U.S. Declares Shortage on Colorado River,
Forcing
Water
Cuts,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
27,
2021),
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doctrine to apply in water disputes.
In prior disputes over surface water, the Court has applied the
doctrine of equitable apportionment, determining the percentage of
the disputed water each party is allowed to use.5 In Mississippi v.
Tennessee, the Court was presented with a case of first impression and
had to decide whether to extend the doctrine of equitable
apportionment to ground water.6 There, the Court ruled in favor of
Respondent Tennessee7—extending the equitable apportionment
doctrine and endorsing a flexible approach that encourages states to
negotiate their use of a shared water resource. In ruling for Tennessee,
the Court rejected Petitioner Mississippi’s arguments regarding state
sovereignty and Mississippi’s inherent rights to the contested water.
Tennessee was successful, and, as argued in this Commentary, the
Court ruled correctly. Adopting Mississippi’s territorial integrity
argument would have potentially caused chaos in interstate
groundwater disputes by upsetting the established paradigm—
encouraging states to engage in litigation over groundwater resources
and ultimately inflaming tensions between neighboring states.8 Given
these high stakes, the Court properly refrained from bucking legal
precedent.
I. FACTS
The procedural background of this case is complex. Mississippi first
sued the city of Memphis in 2005, alleging that since 1965, there have
been 363 billion gallons of water removed unlawfully from Mississippi.9
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/16/climate/colorado-river-water-cuts.html
(describing
negotiations between seven states which use the Colorado River for water supply).
5. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Overruling Mississippi’s
Exceptions to the Rep. of the Special Master at 14, Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2916 (2015)
(mem.) (No. 143, Original) [hereinafter Brief for the United States Regarding Special Master]
(citing cases from as early as 1907 that used “the application of equitable appointment to
interstate resources”).
6. Id. at 17 (“The groundwater at issue here exhibits the same characteristics that this Court
emphasized in finding the doctrine of equitable appointment applicable . . . .”).
7. The opinion for this case was released on November 22, 2021, much earlier than the
usual two/three-month period between oral arguments and the Court’s released opinion. The
Court ruled 9-0 in favor of Tennessee, dismissing Mississippi’s Complaint, in an opinion written
by Chief Justice John Roberts.
8. Dan Elliott, Feud Erupts between Utility, US states over Colorado River, A.P. NEWS
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://apnews.com/article/7c18b7a58f034df6b6341ebf1cd6d8c0 (explaining the
tension between states that share the Colorado River).
9. Boyce Upholt, An Interstate Battle for Groundwater, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 4, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2015/12/mississippi-memphis-tenneseegroundwateraquifer/418809/.
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The suit was dismissed by the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P.
19(a)(1),10 and upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit who noted that Mississippi failed to join a necessary and
independent party, Tennessee.11 The district court dismissed the suit
because joining Tennessee would force the suit to become an action
between states, triggering the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.12 The Fifth Circuit then affirmed the district court’s holding,
finding that the portion of the Aquifer belonging to each state should
be allocated using equitable apportionment.13 The Fifth Circuit
rejected Mississippi’s argument that because the water used by
Memphis was an intrastate resource within its “state boundaries,”
Tennessee was not a necessary party.14 Mississippi then filed a Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari, and a Motion for Leave to File Bill of
Complaint in Original Action, both of which were denied by the
Court.15 In denying the latter, the Court indicated its approval of
extending the doctrine of equitable apportionment to ground water
disputes between states.16
Mississippi regrouped and began new litigation. On June 6, 2014,
Mississippi moved for Leave to File a Bill of Complaint against the
defendants—the state of Tennessee, the city of Memphis, and Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Division—in an original action before the Supreme
Court.17 The new Complaint again alleged that defendants violated
Mississippi’s retained sovereignty by forcibly pumping groundwater
“stored and exclusively residing within Mississippi’s territorial
10. Requiring that a person subject to process and whose joinder will not deprive the court
of subject-matter jurisdiction be joined if:
“(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
disposing of the action in the person’s absence may: (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the
person’s ability to protect the interest; or (ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk
of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.”
11. Hood ex rel. Miss. v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 629 (5th Cir. 2009).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 630 (“Determining Mississippi and Tennessee’s relative rights to the Aquifer
brings this case squarely within the original development and application of the equitable
apportionment doctrine.”).
14. Id.
15. Michael D. Tauer, Evolution of the Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment—Mississippi
v. Memphis, 41 UNIV. MEM. L. REV. 897, 922 (2011).
16. Id. at 922–23. (pointing to Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 74 n.9 (2003), where the
Supreme Court stated that “[f]ederal common law governs interstate bodies of water, ensuring
that the water is equitably apportioned between the States and that neither State harms the
other’s interest in the river”).
https://www.scotusblog.com/case17. Mississippi
v.
Tennessee,
SCOTUSBLOG,
files/cases/mississippi-v-tennessee (last visited Nov. 10, 2021) [hereinafter SCOTUSblog].
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borders.”18 The Supreme Court granted leave on June 29, 2015 and
appointed the Hon. Eugene E. Siler as Special Master in the case.19 The
Special Master filed his report on November 5, 2020, and the parties
filed their exceptions to the Special Master’s report on February 22,
2021.20 Oral arguments were held on October 4, 2021.21 The Acting
Solicitor General also participated as an amicus curiae.22
The contested water in the litigation is located in the Mississippi
Embayment Regional Aquifer System, specifically within the Middle
Claiborne Aquifer.23 The Middle Claiborne Aquifer is the second
largest producer of groundwater24 in the Mississippi Embayment.25 The
Middle Claiborne Aquifer is located hundreds of feet below the surface
of eight states and covers more than 70,000 square miles.26 The water
in the Aquifer naturally flows from east to west.27
Memphis, Tennessee is the largest urban area located within the
Aquifer and relies significantly on groundwater to meet its water
needs.28 Memphis began pumping water from the Aquifer in 1886, and
today, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division operates over 160 wells
inside the state of Tennessee.29 This groundwater is the only source of
public water for Shelby County, where Memphis is located.30 Shelby

18. Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi on its Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint
in Original Action at 1, Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2916 (2015) (mem.) (No. 143, Original)
[hereinafter Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi].
19. SCOTUSblog, supra note 17.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Brief for the United States Regarding Special Master, supra note 5, at 4.
24. There are ten hydrogeological units within the Mississippi Embayment, with the Middle
Claiborne Aquifer holding around nine percent of the total water within the Mississippi
Embayment System. Brian R. Clark et al., U.S. Geological Survey, Groundwater Availability of
the Mississippi Embayment, USGS Professional Paper 1785 8, 10 (2011),
http://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/1785/pdf/PP1785.pdf.
25. This Aquifer is also referred to as the “Sparta-Memphis” Aquifer, deriving the name
from the “Sparta Sands” and “Memphis Sands” regions of the Middle Claiborne Aquifer. Brief
for the United States Regarding Special Master, supra note 5, at 3.
26. The eight states are: Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Arkansas, Missouri,
Kentucky, and Illinois. Christine A. Klein, Owning Groundwater: The Example of Mississippi v.
Tennessee, 35 VA. ENV’T L. J. 474, 520 (2017).
27. Supplemental Brief of the State of Mississippi in Response to Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae at 3, Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2916 (2015) (No. 143, Original)
[hereinafter Supplemental Brief of the State of Mississippi].
28. Clark, supra note 24, at 8.
29. Brief for the United States Regarding Special Master, supra note 5, at 4. While Memphis
has been using water since the 1880s, the amount pumped from the Aquifer was ten times more
than it pumped in 1890 and is certainly much higher in modern times. Clark, supra note 24, at 17.
30. Clark, supra note 24, at 8.
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County alone uses an average of 180 million gallons of water a day,
enough to satisfy the water needs of its agricultural sector and
Memphis’ population of 650,000.31 But the groundwater is equally
important to Mississippi, as it supplies 89 percent of the state’s public
water.32
Today, Inter-Aquifer horizontal water flow accounts for 48.7
percent of the groundwater inflow to the Memphis area.33 Additionally,
the Aquifer has become the second fastest depleted aquifer system in
the country, seeing a yearly decline of around one foot of water a year,
making the question of who has rights to use the Aquifer’s groundwater
increasingly important.34
The outcome of the case rested in large part on how the Supreme
Court viewed the relevant facts. Mississippi contended that the Aquifer
is “confined”35 and that under natural conditions the water used by
Memphis would stay within the borders of Mississippi.36 In making this
argument, Mississippi cited the fact that Memphis’s recent use of water
wells for agricultural and industrial uses has created “cones of
depression”37 within the Aquifer.38 These cones of depressions can,
under certain conditions, cause water to flow in the direction of the
wells.39 Mississippi believed that these wells cause water to flow back
north towards Memphis from Mississippi.40 Tennessee rejected
Mississippi’s attempt to break the Aquifer into separate and distinct
sections, where each state could lay claim to water that flowed out of
its jurisdiction; instead, it simply viewed the contested water as part of
an interstate water resource.41
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Clark, supra note 24, at 31.
34. Upholt, supra note 9.
35. A confined aquifer can transmit and store water under pressure and is located between
impermeable rock. The Sparta Sands Aquifer is bounded by impermeable clay formations.
Supplemental Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 27, at 3.
36. Id. at 1.
37. A “cone of depression” is where water withdrawn from wells causes the potentiometric
level in the well to drop, causing more water to flow into the well and lowering potentiometric
levels in the groundwater surrounding the well. Water flows from high potentiometric levels to
low potentiometric levels. Brief for the United States Regarding Special Master, supra note 5, at
3.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id. at 3–4.
40. Supplemental Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 27, at 3–4 (arguing that
Tennessee “could and should have located MLGW’s massive well fields further from the
Mississippi/Tennessee border, limiting withdrawal to the natural recharge in Tennessee . . . .”).
41. Tennessee Opposition Brief, infra note 103, at 18.
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II. LEGAL HISTORY
A. Equitable Apportionment and Interstate Water Resources
In the past, interstate bodies of water have been governed by
federal common law, which ensures that “water is equitably
apportioned between the States.”42 When disputes arise over interstate
waters, states have two solutions: to “enter an interstate compact” or
“petition the Supreme Court for equitable apportionment.”43 Congress
can also choose to divide the waters up itself.44 No compact governing
groundwater had been created between the states in this case.45
The doctrine of equitable apportionment governs how “the
Supreme Court has traditionally allocated water in disputes between
states over their shared surface water resources.”46 When issuing a
decree of equitable apportionment, the Court determines how much
water each state is allowed to use.47 The doctrine focuses on distributing
water based on “equality of rights” as opposed to a strict even division
of water.48 This means equitable apportionment is a flexible doctrine in
practice, taking into account various factors, including:
“physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of
water in the several sections of the river, the character and rate
of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability
of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on
downstream areas, [and] the damage to upstream areas as
compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is

42. Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56, 74 n.9 (2003).
43. Report of the Special Master at 26, Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2916 (2015) (No.
143, Original). The interstate compacts require Congressional approval. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §
10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State . . . .”).
44. Jamie Huffman, Mississippi v. Tennessee: Analysis and Implications, 28 N.Y.U. ENV’T
L.J., 227, 231 (2020).
45. In total, twenty-seven compacts governing surface water have been created. See Noah
D. Hall & Benjamin L. Cavataro, Interstate Groundwater Law in the Snake Valley: Equitable
Apportionment and a New Model for Transboundary Aquifer Management, 2013 UTAH L. REV.
1553, 1571 (2013).
46. Huffman, supra note 44, at 232.
47. U.S. Supreme Court: Equitable Apportionment, ATLANTA REG’L COMM’N (Feb. 3,
2021),
https://atlantaregional.org/natural-resources/water-wars/u-s-supreme-court-equitableapportionment.
48. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 100–01 (1907). (arguing the Supreme Court is
“justified in looking at the question not narrowly and solely as to the amount of the flow in the
channel of the Arkansas river, inquiring merely whether any portion thereof is appropriated by
Colorado, but we may properly consider what, in case a portion of that flow is appropriated by
Colorado, are the effects of such appropriation upon Kansas territory”).
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imposed on the former . . . .”49

Due to this flexible doctrine, “state borders are not dispositive in
resolving competing claims” over interstate water where equitable
apportionment applies.50
Because equitable apportionment falls under the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction, parties seeking equitable apportionment must first
obtain leave to file a lawsuit.51 The party seeking relief must allege a
“real and substantial injury”52 by clear and convincing evidence and, by
the same standard, must also show that the “harms of apportionment
are ‘substantially outweigh[ed]’ by the benefits.”53
The first case to deal with equitable apportionment in water
disputes was Kansas v. Colorado.54 There, the Court applied the
doctrine to solve a dispute in which Kansas believed Colorado was
diminishing the flow of surface water from the Arkansas River by
taking water for irrigation.55 The Court’s stated goal was to settle the
dispute “in such a way as will recognize the equal rights of both [states]
and at the same time establish justice between them.”56 The Court later
held that the doctrine includes waters that are connected to surface
waters.57
The equitable apportionment doctrine has even been extended to
resources like migratory fish in Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon.58 The
Court, when applying the doctrine, focused on the presence of two

49. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
50. Peter G. Berris, Mississippi v. Tennessee: Resolving an Interstate Groundwater Dispute,
12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 1, 6 (2016); See Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S.
310, 323 (1984) (“[T]he source of the Vermejo River’s waters should be essentially irrelevant to
the adjudication of these sovereigns’ competing claims.”).
51. Huffman, supra note 44, at 233.
52. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1027 (1983).
53. Huffman, supra note 44, at 233 (quoting Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502, 2535 (2018)
(Thomas, J. dissenting)).
54. See generally 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (holding that Kansas did not have a claim but that the
Court could re-visit the issue if the water situation worsens).
55. Brief for the United States Regarding Special Master, supra note 5, at 14.
56. 206 U.S. at 98.
57. See Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 524 (1936) (equitable apportionment applies
when “‘a substantial part of the water applied to irrigation in Oregon . . . goes into the
underground water supply’ and returns to the river”).
58. In this case, Idaho sued for equitable apportionment of transient fish that spawn in the
snake river in Idaho, travel to the Atlantic Ocean, and then later return to their origins. Idaho’s
Complaint alleged that as the fish traveled back up stream, fishermen and dams in Oregon and
Washington were trapping a disproportionate number of fish. See generally 462 U.S. 1017 (1983)
(finding that Idaho had not shown that it was being “deprived of its equitable share of
anadromous fish”).
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factors: the resource’s movement between state lines, and whether
actions in one state can affect the availability of the resource in another
state.59 Although groundwater is distinguishable from surface water,
particularly because it moves much slower and is not visible, the
Court’s prior willingness to extend equitable apportionment beyond
surface water signals that the doctrine’s application to groundwater
would be consistent with precedent.
B. The “Equal Footing Doctrine” and Retained Sovereignty
Article 4, Section 3 of the United States Constitution governs the
admission of new states into the Union, stating:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but
no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any
other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more
States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the
States concerned as well as of the Congress.60
Congress created the “equal footing doctrine” and applied it to all
admitted states. All states’ acts of admission must include a clause
stating that the state enters “on an equal footing with the original states
in all respects . . . .”61 This equal footing doctrine provides that “because
the ‘shores of navigable waters, and the soils under them . . . were
reserved to the states respectively,’ the ‘new states have the same rights,
sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this subject as the original states.’”62
The Supreme Court has ruled that the equal footing doctrine
applies to water rights.63 The Supreme Court held in Kansas v. Colorado
that states have “full jurisdiction over the lands within [their] borders,
including the beds of streams and other waters.”64 In Tarrant Reg’l
Water Dist. v. Herrmann, the Court made clear that “[s]tates possess an
‘absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them
59. Brief for the United States Regarding Special Master, supra note 5, at 15.
60. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
at
n.264
61. Doctrine
of
The
Equality
of
States,
JUSTIA
https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/article-4/15-doctrine-of-the-equality-of-states.html
(last
visited Nov. 11, 2021).
62. Berris, supra note 50, at 8 (quoting Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 230 (1845)). U.S.
CONST. amend. X. (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”)
63. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926) (“[U]nder the constitutional
principle of equity among the several states the title to the bed of Mud Lake then passed to the
state, if the lake was navigable, and if the bed had not already been disposed of by the United
States.”).
64. 206 U.S. 46, 93 (1907).
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for their own common use,’”65 and “ownership of submerged lands, and
the accompanying power to control . . . other public uses of water, ‘is an
essential attribute of sovereignty.’”66
C. Summary of Mississippi’s Argument
Mississippi made three main arguments to the Court. First,
Mississippi argued the current litigation should not be precluded by the
Fifth Circuit’s prior ruling.67 Second, Mississippi argued that it is
entitled to remedies, other than equitable apportionment, for
Tennessee’s violation of “Mississippi’s sovereign territory.”68 Third and
finally, Mississippi argued that the contested water is an intrastate
resource and not subject to equitable apportionment.69
Mississippi first argued that the Fifth’s Circuit’s holding mandating
equitable apportionment was invalid.70 Mississippi contended that
because the conflict is between two sovereign states, the Supreme
Court holds original jurisdiction over the matter.71 Mississippi then
further argued that preclusion would delegate the Supreme Court’s
exclusive power to lower courts lacking proper jurisdiction.72
Mississippi also opposed preclusion on the ground that the Fifth
Circuit’s holding in favor of equitable apportionment was not essential
to the judgment.73 Once it was determined that Mississippi’s claims
implicated Tennessee, making Tennessee a required party, the lower
courts did not need to identify the type of claims Mississippi could or
could not assert against Tennessee.74 Mississippi, citing Mississippi v.
Louisiana,75 rejected the claim that a denial of certiorari in the previous
case precluded their new Complaint.76
Second, Mississippi argued that the current case fell outside the
purview of the equitable apportionment doctrine, so it was entitled to

65. 569 U.S. 614, 616 (2013) (quoting Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842)).
66. Id. (quoting United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)).
67. Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 18, at 12.
68. Supplemental Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 27, at 9.
69. Id. at 3.
70. Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 18, at 9–10.
71. Id. at 12; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1. (“The Judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, . . . to Controversies between two or more States . . . .”).
72. Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 18, at 9.
73. Id. at 11.
74. Id.
75. 506 U.S. 73, 76 (1992) (rejecting the idea that a denial of certiorari amounts to the
Court’s adoption of the lower court’s holding).
76. Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 18, at 11–12.
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damages and restitution for the water taken by Tennessee.77 The
Supreme Court has the authority in an original action to grant
whatever relief is deemed appropriate.78 Because the asserted harms
fell under “serious violations of sovereign territorial rights,” Mississippi
demanded payment from Tennessee based on theories of restitution. In
Mississippi’s opinion, equitable apportionment would not function as a
remedy, but rather give Tennessee rights to take water that does not
belong to it.79 In this instance, Mississippi’s preferred remedies would
be restitution for water already taken, and an injunction to prevent
more water from being taken in the future.80 In contrast, the application
of equitable apportionment would divide the contested water between
Mississippi and Tennessee for future use, and Mississippi would remain
uncompensated for water taken by Tennessee to date.
Finally, Mississippi argued that equitable apportionment is
inappropriate because the contested water is “trapped within its
territorial borders in a deep confined aquifer under natural
conditions.”81 The crutch of this argument is that equitable
apportionment under current case law applies only “to intrastate
groundwater which is . . . hydrologically connected to interstate surface
water already apportioned by the Court or an interstate compact.”82 In
this case, the Middle Claiborne Aquifer is not a free-flowing
underground lake, and it does not flow unencumbered like surface
water rivers.83 Moreover, groundwater is hidden from view in small
pores between various sediments, with murky boundaries and varying
hydraulic potential.84
Mississippi contested the Special Master’s finding that the water

77. Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 18, at 8. (citing Kansas v Colorado,
533 U.S. 1, 6 (“[i]n proper original actions money damages are available”).
78. Id.; see also Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1052 (2015) (“[T]he court may regulate
and mould the process it uses in such a manner as in its judgment will best promote the purposes
of justice.” (quoting Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 98 (1861))).
79. Mississippi Brief in Support of Exceptions, infra note 83, at 36.
80. Id. at 46.
81. Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 18, at 3; see also Supplemental Brief
of the State of Mississippi, supra note 27, at 3 (stating that the Sparta Sands Aquifer is “confined”
and “[t]he groundwater at issue was naturally collected and stored over thousands of years within
Mississippi”).
82. Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 18, at 4.
83. Exceptions to Report of the Special Master by Plaintiff State of Mississippi and Brief in
Support of
Exceptions at 2, Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2916 (2015) (No. 143, Original) [hereinafter
Mississippi Brief in Support of Exceptions].
84. Id. at 5. (stressing the physical differences between groundwater and surface water).
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was an interstate resource, noting that the water resided originally in
Mississippi and does not behave like a river that flows within multiple
states.85 Mississippi posited that “[t]he fact that [the groundwater] has
‘existed’ and ‘occurred’ within the land making up Mississippi for
centuries, makes it ‘intrastate’ by definition.”86 Mississippi further
contested the Special Master’s conclusion that the Sparta Sands
Aquifer and Memphis Sands Aquifer are a single hydrogeological unit,
claiming instead they exist as separate Aquifers.87 Mississippi asserted
that the subterranean movement of the water is more complex than
surface level waters and thus requires a different solution, such as the
application of state tort law.88
Even if the groundwater is interstate, Mississippi contended that
equitable apportionment only applies to “naturally shared water.”89
Under the natural conditions which existed when Mississippi was
admitted to the Union, Mississippi has “complete sovereign authority”
over the groundwater through the equal footing doctrine.90 Mississippi
asserted that the water Tennessee is using is not naturally shared
because without pumping, “none of the groundwater being claimed
would have ever entered Tennessee.”91 Only recent technology has
allowed Tennessee to access Mississippi groundwater,92 which has
“divest[ed] [Mississippi] of the authority to preserve and regulate the
use of natural resources naturally residing within its sovereign territory
. . . .”93 Mississippi stated that pumping is not covered by the term,

85. Id. at 18–19.
86. Id. at 35. See also Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. New Sea Escape Cruises, Ltd., 894 So.2d 954,
961 (Fla. 2005) (“The term ‘intrastate’ is commonly construed as meaning ‘existing or occurring
within a state.’”).
87. Mississippi Brief in Support of Exceptions, supra note 83, at 33 (“Mississippi has
consistently noted the geographic, geological, and hydrological distinctions between the Sparta
Sand . . . and the Memphis Sand . . . .”).
88. See id. (“The complexities of groundwater shown in the evidentiary hearing merely
demonstrate the inapplicability of the equitable apportionment cases involving interstate rivers
and streams.”).
89. Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 18, at 6.
90. Id. at 7; Mississippi Brief in Support of Exceptions, supra note 83, at 3 (“States retain all
title, jurisdiction, and sovereign authority over lands and waters not ceded to the federal
government which they possessed as separate nations before ratification of the Constitution.”).
91. Supplemental Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 27, at 1.
92. Mississippi focuses on 170 water wells that began pumping no later than 1985, resulting
in over 400 billion gallons of groundwater moving out of Mississippi into Tennessee. Reply Brief
of the State of Mississippi, supra note 18, at 2, 6.
93. Supplemental Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 27, at 7. (arguing that
Tennessee has “no right to reach into and invade Mississippi’s sovereign territory through
artificial, mechanical, or technological means to forcibly capture groundwater”).

SWEET_COMMENTARY_2.14.22_FINAL_SEND (DO NOT DELETE)

226

2/18/2022 12:42 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 17

“agency of natural law,”94 arguing that the term should apply to
“undisturbed flow of surface water downstream” but not “mechanical
application[s] of the law of physics” like mechanical pistons.95
In this case, the Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Division has created
a regional cone of depression through its use of pumps, pulling water
into Tennessee that would naturally remain within the territorial
control of Mississippi.96 Mississippi claimed the Aquifer’s water flow
has shifted from its natural flow in a westward and southern direction
to a northern direction towards Memphis.97 Mississippi cited Tarrant
Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann98 as precedent that states have
sovereignty over water within their geographical boundaries.99
Applying Tarrant, Mississippi believed Tennessee had used their wells
to physically take water from within Mississippi’s borders.100 Mississippi
did not contend “that Defendants are taking too much water from
Mississippi, [but] that Defendants have no right . . . to take any
groundwater located in Mississippi . . .”101
D. Summary of Defendants’ Argument
The Defendants—the state of Tennessee, the city of Memphis, and
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division—made three primary
arguments.102 First, Tennessee argued Mississippi’s Complaint should
94. Id. at 7–8; see Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97–98 (1907) (“Yet, whenever . . . the
action of one state reaches, through the agency of natural laws, into the territory of another state,
the question of the extent and the limitations of the rights of the two states becomes a matter of
justiciable dispute between them . . . .”).
95. Supplemental Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 27, at 7–8. (rejecting
Tennessee’s use of Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901), where the Court issued an injunction
against Illinois who wanted to build an artificial channel to dump sewage into the Chicago River
which ultimately through river flows ended up in the Mississippi River flowing through Missouri;
Mississippi believes that only the flow of the water in the rivers is classified under the “agency of
natural laws”).
96. Mississippi Brief in Support of Exceptions, supra note 83, at 1. Mississippi contends that
under natural conditions, water in the Aquifer moves at only a rate of one mile every 175 years,
and that groundwater collected in the territory that is now Mississippi would stay within
Mississippi on for around 7,500 years on average. Id. at 8.
97. Id. at 15–16.
98. 569 U.S. 614, 631 (2013) (referencing “the well-established principle that States do not
easily cede their sovereign powers, including their control over waters within their own
territories”).
99. Mississippi Brief in Support of Exceptions, supra note 83, at 24.
100. Under an agreement, Texas had a twenty-five percent claim to surface water from the
Red River in Oklahoma, but it could not force Oklahoma to give up water it has impounded from
the Red River, which eventually would have flowed into Texas. Mississippi Brief in Support of
Exceptions, supra note 83, at 24.
101. Id. at 36.
102. For brevity, “Tennessee” or “defendants” will be used as shorthand for all three
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be precluded by the Fifth Circuit’s prior holding.103 Second, Tennessee
argued equitable apportionment is the proper remedy, and the lower
courts were correct to reject Mississippi’s “territorial property rights
theory.”104 Third, Tennessee objected to the Special Master’s
determination that Mississippi be given leave to amend their
Complaint.105 Tennessee instead asserted the Complaint should be
dismissed with prejudice, preventing Mississippi from amending the
Complaint to seek equitable apportionment as a remedy.106
First, the Defendants believed that the current litigation should be
precluded because the Fifth Circuit has already held that Mississippi
has no enforceable right to the groundwater without equitable
apportionment.107 Until Mississippi obtains apportionment from the
Aquifer, it should be precluded from suing another state for infringing
on its share.108 The Defendants asserted that Mississippi is simply
attempting to relitigate the exact same arguments that it argued, and
lost, in the Fifth Circuit, placing this case under the doctrine of issue
preclusion.109
Second, the Defendants rejected Mississippi’s contention that they
have “sovereign ownership” over the groundwater within their
geographical boundaries.110 Tennessee asserted that even Mississippi
recognizes that the Aquifer straddles both states, making the water an
interstate resource, and that claims of ownership necessarily implicated
the rights of both states.111 Defendants cited Idaho ex rel. Evans v.
Oregon to support their proposition that an interstate natural resource
cannot be seized for exclusive use simply because it happens to be
within one state’s geographical boundaries at the moment of seizure.112
defendants.
103. Brief of Defendant State of Tennessee in Opposition to State of Mississippi’s Motion
for Leave to File Bill of Complaint in Original Action at 3, Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct.
2916 (2015) (mem.) (No. 143, Original) [hereinafter Tennessee Opposition Brief].
104. Id.
105. Exception in Part of Defendants State of Tennessee, City of Memphis, and Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Division to Report of the Special Master and Brief in Support of Exception
at 1, Mississippi, 135 S. Ct. 2916 (No. 143, Original) [hereinafter Tennessee Exception in Part].
106. Reply of Defendant State of Tennessee to Exceptions of Plaintiff State of Mississippi to
Report of the Special Master at 1, Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2916 (No. 143, Original).
107. Tennessee Opposition Brief, supra note 103, at 23.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 26–27 (quoting Parklane Hosiery, Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979)).
110. Id. at 14. Tennessee argues that a state “may not preserve solely for its own inhabitants
natural resources located within its borders.” Id. at 15 (quoting Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462
U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983)).
111. Id. at 18.
112. See Tennessee Opposition Brief, supra note 103, at 15 (quoting id. at 1025) (“[A] State
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According to the Defendants, both groundwater and surface water
“share salient hydrological characteristics” that make groundwater an
appropriate resource for equitable apportionment.113 In Tennessee’s
opinion, water flowing over the state border because of cones of
depression from pumping is an example of “the agency of natural laws”
in action.114
Third, Tennessee disagreed with the Special Master’s
recommendation that Mississippi be given leave to amend its
Complaint to include equitable apportionment.115 Tennessee believed
that an amended Complaint including equitable apportionment as a
remedy sought would “take the litigation beyond what [this Court]
reasonably anticipated when [it] granted leave to file the initial
pleadings.”116 Tennessee reminded the Court that Mississippi had
affirmatively disavowed equitable apportionment as an appropriate
remedy for the claimed injury.117 Tennessee maintained that the Court
should thus deny Mississippi the opportunity to “reverse course” and
assert an equitable apportionment claim midway through litigation.118
Furthermore, Tennessee noted that equitable apportionment
differs drastically from the remedies Mississippi sought under tort
claims.119 Tennessee did not believe Mississippi had properly showed a
“substantial injury” to its ability to use the shared resource, which is a
threshold requirement to equitable apportionment claims.120 Tennessee
was worried that an amended Complaint would burden the Defendants
with litigation costs, requiring another round of costly discovery and
fact finding beyond the questions that had been litigated to date.121
Tennessee further voiced concern that equitable apportionment could
affect states not party to the dispute, but which could have an interest

may not preserve solely for its own inhabitants natural resources located within its borders.”).
The migratory fish in Idaho is compared to the groundwater in the current case. Idaho had an
equitable claim to the fish as an interstate resource, even though they were entirely physically
located within Oregon during parts of the migration. Id. at 20.
113. Id. at 19.
114. Id. (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907)).
115. Tennessee Exception in Part, supra note 105106, at 1.
116. Id. at 16. (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 8 (1995)).
117. Id. at 17.
118. Id.at 16, 19.
119. Id. at 13.
120. Id. at 17.
121. Id. at 24. Tennessee emphasizes that equitable apportionment is a flexible remedy which
takes many factors into consideration while the current litigation focuses on the narrow question
of whether Mississippi has “inherent property rights” to the groundwater. Id. at 18.
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in the apportionment of the Aquifer groundwater.122
E. Report of the Special Master
A special master is a court-appointed officer instructed to issue a
report of factual findings—and here, a recommendation—where
special expertise is needed to evaluate a case.123 The Special Master in
this case recommended that the Court dismiss the Complaint with
leave to amend.124 Specifically, the Special Master recommended that
the Supreme Court hold: “(1) the groundwater contained in the Middle
Claiborne Aquifer is the resource at issue; (2) that resource is interstate;
and (3) equitable apportionment is the appropriate remedy for the
alleged harm.”125
After evidentiary hearings, the Special Master concluded that the
Middle Claiborne Aquifer is a single hydrogeological unit, consisting of
Sparta Sands in its southern portions and Memphis Sands in its
northern portions.126 The Special Master rejected Mississippi’s
argument that the Middle Claiborne Aquifer should be viewed as
discrete, constituent units.127 The Special Master noted that the
definition of an aquifer is “a collection of interconnected units that
contains enough permeable material to yield usable quantities of
waters to wells and springs.”128 Thus, the Special Master determined
that merely because a specific subunit is entirely within one state’s
borders “does not extinguish its interstate nature.”129 Additional
evidence demonstrated that water pumped from both Shelby County,
Tennessee, and DeSoto County, Mississippi, came from the same
source.130 Furthermore, the potentiometric levels131 of the Aquifer

122. Id. at 18–19. Tennessee is particularly concerned about Arkansas, which pumps water
from the same aquifer.
123. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUD. CTR., SPECIAL MASTERS’ INCIDENCE AND
ACTIVITY 1, (2000); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1) (“[A] court may appoint a master . . . to . . .
hold trial proceedings and make or recommend findings of fact on issues to be decided without a
jury if appointment is warranted by . . . some exceptional condition . . . .”)
124. Report of the Special Master, supra note 43, at 2.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 15. The Special Master notes this is consistent with the United States Geological
Survey.
127. Id. at 17.
128. Id. at 17–18.
129. Id. at 18.
130. Id. at 20.
131. Potentiometric levels measure the water levels within an aquifer and can be helpful in
mapping cones of depression from well use and where groundwater is being depleted or collected.
See Clark, supra note 24, at 24.
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“extend across the state borders uninterrupted.”132 The Special Master
noted Mississippi’s own claims are self-defeating.133 Mississippi did not
assert Tennessee’s pumps physically entered Mississippi’s territory, but
rather that Tennessee’s pumping is creating a cone of depression that
spills across state borders—thus demonstrating that “there is a single
hydrogeologic unit that spans across state boundaries.”134
Mississippi did not contest the fact that at least some groundwater
moves naturally across state borders, and the Special Master
determined “any interstate movement demonstrates an interconnected
hydrogeological unit.”135 Furthermore, the Middle Claiborne Aquifer is
connected to the Wolf River, an interstate surface water resource
flowing from Mississippi to Tennessee.136 The hydrological connection
of the Aquifer to interstate surface waters further supported the
Special Master’s conclusion that the groundwater is an interstate
resource.137
The Special Master also determined that equitable apportionment
was the proper remedy, rejecting alternative remedies that Mississippi
proposed.138 The Special Master noted there is no existing compact or
apportionment governing the Aquifer.139 The Special Master rejected
Mississippi’s contention that equitable apportionment only applies to
disputed interstate surface waters.140 The Special Master acknowledged
that it is more difficult to apply the equitable apportionment doctrine
to groundwater, but rejected the idea that pumping groundwater is
meaningfully different from other actions that affect a neighboring
state “through the operation of natural laws.”141 Additionally, the
Special Master was unconvinced that wells dug within Tennessee’s
territory physically encroach on Mississippi’s territory, as was the case
of the water taken in Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrman.142 The
132. Report of the Special Master, supra note 43, at 20.
133. Id. at 21
134. Id.
135. Id. at 25.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 26.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 27–28. (“[G]roundwater in aquifers and surface water in streams, rivers and lakes
are not identical. But that is not the inquiry. Instead, any differences must be legally meaningful.
And they are not.”)
141. Id at 28.
142. Id. at 29–30 (“Tarrant only protects a state against physical intrusion. Indeed, the Court
has never suggested a state can sue for the effects of resource collection that happen outside its
borders—that is, in the absence of equitable apportionment.” (citing Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v.
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Special Master rejected Mississippi’s application of state law doctrine,
asserting that federal common law displaces those claims.143 The Special
Master, however, did recommend that the Court allow Mississippi to
amend its Complaint to seek equitable apportionment.144
IV. ORAL ARGUMENT
The justices began oral arguments by questioning counsel for
Mississippi.145 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Barrett inquired as to
why equitable apportionment should not apply to groundwater, to
which Mississippi responded that it may apply, but equitable
apportionment fails to remedy the alleged offenses.146 Justice Thomas
was skeptical that Tennessee violated Mississippi’s territorial integrity
because Tennessee’s water wells are located in Tennessee.147 Justice
Kagan then pressed Mississippi’s counsel and elicited a concession that
Mississippi’s legal argument is not dependent on whether the
groundwater is actually an interstate resource.148 Justices Roberts and
Breyer pondered if a wild pack of burros that roamed between states
entered Tennessee, if Tennessee could seize the burros and prevent
them from leaving the state.149 Mississippi’s counsel answered that
Tennessee probably could not; but Mississippi distinguished between
forcibly keeping resources inside the state and stopping another state
from taking those resources out of the state.150 Justices Sotomayor and
Gorsuch appeared skeptical that Mississippi should be given leave to
amend their Complaint to ask for equitable apportionment after
litigating the case for more than sixteen years.151 During his
questioning, Justice Kavanaugh focused on policy considerations and
appeared concerned about the potential for uncertainty in the use of
natural resources.152
Justice Thomas asked Tennessee why it could not simply move its
wells, to which counsel responded that Mississippi also has wells close
Herrman, 569 U.S. 614, 624 (2013))).
143. Id. at 31.
144. Id. at 32.
145. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–5, Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2916 (2015)
(mem.) (No. 143, Original).
146. Id. at 11–12, 26–27.
147. Id. at 7–9.
148. Id. at 12–13.
149. Id. at 19–23.
150. Id. at 23–24.
151. Id. at 16–17, 32–33.
152. Id. at 28–30.
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to the border and there is no evidence that Mississippi is suffering any
appreciable injury from Tennessee’s wells.153 Justice Sotomayor further
inquired whether a nuisance action would also be appropriate in the
current case, only to learn in response that Mississippi did not produce
sufficient evidence to support such an action.154
Justice Kagan asked whether, in the future, technology that could
take water from a lake entirely in Mississippi was distinguishable from
the current case, and Tennessee emphasized the lack of physical
barriers in accessing the groundwater.155 Justices Gorsuch and Breyer
wanted to define the boundaries of the doctrine of equitable
apportionment, as they were worried about an increase in states suing
each other over groundwater resources under original jurisdiction.156
Chief Justice Roberts contemplated if groundwater should be
considered a resource separate from water, given its mixture with other
elements like sand; but Tennessee assured the Chief Justice that
groundwater is still fundamentally water, even if it is mixed with other
elements.157 The Court appeared to be split on whether to grant
Mississippi leave to amend.158
The Solicitor General then spoke as amicus curiae in support of
overruling Mississippi’s objections to the Special Master, contending
that equitable apportionment is the proper way to balance competing
sovereign state interests.159 The Solicitor General was unable to give a
direct answer to Justice Kavanaugh’s question whether the case should
be dismissed with or without prejudice.160 Justice Gorsuch pushed the
Solicitor General to define what level of injury would be sufficient to
file an equitable apportionment claim under original jurisdiction and
appeared unconvinced that a coherent threshold was articulated.161
V. ANALYSIS
In Mississippi v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court addressed for the
first-time interstate conflicts regarding groundwater. The case
presented the Court with an opportunity to extend the doctrine of
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 38–39.
Id. at 41–43.
Id. at 45–50.
Id. at 53–54.
Id. at 51–53.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 67–68.
Id. at 70–71.
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equitable apportionment to aquifers and groundwater. With more than
60 aquifers located within the United States,162 the Court’s holding in
this case had the potential to shape future litigation. The Court
unanimously held that equitable apportionment applied to ground
water and dismissed Mississippi’s Complaint.163 The Court additionally
sustained Tennessee’s objection to the Special Master’s
recommendation to grant leave to Mississippi to amend its Complaint
because Mississippi had “neither sought leave to amend nor tendered
a proposed Complaint seeking equitable apportionment.”164
The Court resolved several questions in this case, including whether
groundwater is like surface water for interstate disputes, whether states
can assert a claim over interstate groundwater using a state sovereignty
argument, and whether Mississippi can amend its Complaint to include
equitable apportionment. Mississippi failed to convince the Court that
it had a pre-existing right to the groundwater pumped by Tennessee or
that it deserved an opportunity to amend its Complaint despite never
properly seeking leave to amend. Tennessee successfully convinced the
Court that equitable apportionment was the correct remedy and that
the Court should dismiss the current Complaint with prejudice to avoid
prolonging the lengthy litigation on this issue.
A. Is the Action Precluded, and can Mississippi Amend its Complaint?
On the issue of preclusion, the Court correctly sided with
Mississippi. The litigation had been ongoing at various levels for sixteen
years, but the case before the Supreme Court was unique in that
another state, Tennessee, had been joined.165 Although the Court is not
obligated to grant leave for parties to file a Complaint in original
jurisdiction,166 in this instance the Court granted Mississippi leave,
signaling that the Court was unlikely to find the issue precluded.
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling was predicated on the
necessity of joining Tennessee as a party.167 Because disputes between
162. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., PRINCIPAL AQUIFERS OF THE UNITED STATES PRINTABLE
MAP WITH EXPLANATION (2021), available at https://www.usgs.gov/media/files/principalaquifers-united-states-printable-map-explanation.
163. Mississippi v. Tennessee, 142 S. Ct. 31, 41 (2021).
164. Id. at 42.
165. Brief for the United States Regarding Special Master, supra note 5, at 6.
166. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S.
Ct. 2916 (No. 143, Original) (2021) (mem.) (noting that the Court has “substantial discretion to
make case-by-case judgments as to the practical necessity” of exercising original jurisdiction
(quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 570 (1983))).
167. See Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 631 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e
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states fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, lower
courts were improper venues in which to seek relief and could not grant
the remedy of equitable apportionment.168
Mississippi, however, was not seeking equitable apportionment,
having disclaimed equitable apportionment as a suitable remedy to its
alleged harm.169 Both the Defendants, and the United States as amicus,
believed that Mississippi’s claim should be dismissed, and Tennessee
further argued Mississippi should be prevented from amending its
Complaint.170 Although Tennessee was likely correct that an amended
Complaint would take more time and cost more to litigate,171 this
conflict is unlikely to disappear even though the Complaint was
dismissed. It would be more efficient for the Court to allow Mississippi
to amend its Complaint to seek equitable apportionment and establish
a baseline for the usage of groundwater in the Aquifer.
Without equitable apportionment, Mississippi is left without even a
court-ordered distribution.172 Without a “material change in
circumstances” leading to a “substantial injury,”173 Mississippi would
also be barred from bringing another lawsuit,174 meaning Mississippi
would be left without recourse to place a limit on Tennessee’s water
usage. It is harsh to punish Mississippi for pursuing remedies via an
alternative legal path if it can meet the threshold for pleading equitable
apportionment in an amended Complaint.
Mississippi did not, however, attempt to file an amended Complaint
seeking equitable apportionment; thus, it left the justices with no other
alternatives but to dismiss the Complaint.175 Because of equitable
apportionment’s flexibility, and given that Memphis is the largest user
of water, Mississippi might have been worried that a court-ordered
find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Tennessee’s presence in the lawsuit was
necessary to accord complete relief to Mississippi and Memphis.”).
168. Reply Brief of the State of Mississippi, supra note 18, at 12.
169. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 145, at 11–12; see also Idaho ex rel. Evans v.
Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025–26 (1983) (“[A]pportionment is based on broad and flexible
equitable concerns rather than on precise legal entitlements . . . a decree is not intended to
compensate for prior legal wrongs.”).
170. Tennessee Exception in Part, supra note 105, at 1; Brief for the United States Regarding
Special Master, supra note 5, at 1.
171. See Tennessee Exception in Part, supra note 105, at 18 (noting that Mississippi’s
amended Complaint may require additional discovery and participation by other interested
states).
172. Id. at 27.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Mississippi v. Tennessee, 142 S. Ct. 31, 42 (2021).

SWEET_COMMENTARY_2.14.22_FINAL_SEND (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

2/18/2022 12:42 PM

ADDRESSING INTERSTATE GROUND WATER OWNERSHIP

235

apportionment could leave it with less water than it currently uses.176 It
is unclear how the municipal needs of Memphis would weigh against
the agricultural interests of Mississippi under equitable apportionment.
Thus, the Court’s decision was correct as it found itself with no other
alternative but to dismiss the case, and Mississippi appeared
uninterested in seeking the remedy of equitable apportionment.
B. Interstate or Intrastate: The Middle Claiborne Aquifer
The Special Master’s Report concluded that the Aquifer was an
interstate resource rather than an intrastate resource.177 Although the
Special Master was appointed to head the fact-finding inquiry and issue
a recommendation, his recommendations do not bind the Court.178
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court correctly followed his
recommendations.
The Special Master’s conclusion appeared to be supported by the
great weight of scientific evidence. The Special Master’s Report aligned
with the data collected from the United States Geological Survey.179 It
also was consistent with how scientists view aquifers and the sediments
and sands that comprise them. Given the nature of the Aquifer, both
parties disputed the actual impact the wells have had on its natural
state. Tennessee also claimed that Mississippi’s wells have yielded a
greater impact on the natural flow of the water.180
The very harms that Mississippi asserted undermined its claim that
the water is not an interstate resource. If water naturally flows across
the border, and the assertion of harm is that too much is flowing, the
pertinent issue became not whether the water is an interstate resource,
but rather what rights Mississippi has to prevent Tennessee from taking
more water. This realization was seemingly acknowledged by
Mississippi in oral arguments when the state conceded that for the
purposes of its argument, it is immaterial whether the water is an
interstate or intrastate resource.181 This concession was odd given that
176. Huffman, supra note 44, at 252.
177. Report of the Special Master, supra note 43, at 2.
178. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(c)–(f) (describing the authority and responsibilities of Special
Masters, but not indicating any power to bind parties through report recommendations).
179. Report of the Special Master, supra note 43, at 2.
180. See Brief for the United States Regarding Special Master, supra note 5, at 11–12. (noting
that wells in Tennessee cause more groundwater, including water from Mississippi, to flow toward
those wells”). But see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 145, at 50 (“Dr. Waldron testified
that there was significant—tens of millions of—of gallons of water every day that was flowing into
Tennessee and out of Tennessee and into Memphis and—and into Mississippi.”).
181. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 145, at 12–13 (“JUSTICE KAGAN: Okay. So
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Mississippi’s legal strategy had previously revolved around assertions
that Tennessee had no right to take any water and that state tort law
was a better remedy.182 It appeared that Mississippi had become
resigned to the fact that the overwhelming weight of evidence
supported the Aquifer’s interstate nature and was attempting to
reconcile this fact with its legal arguments. Thus, given the fact that
Mississippi had apparently conceded this point, and given the factual
findings of the Special Master, the Court correctly decided that the
Aquifer groundwater is an interstate resource and thus subject to
equitable apportionment under federal common law rather than tort
claims rooted in state law.
C. Is Equitable Apportionment the Proper Remedy?
Given the Special Master’s Report, the Court was correct in finding
equitable apportionment under federal common law to be the proper
remedy. Because the Court found the groundwater to be an interstate
resource, federal common law displaced Mississippi’s claims rooted in
state law.183 While Mississippi raised interesting concerns about the role
of technology,184 these concerns were insufficient to demonstrate that
the groundwater used by Tennessee is not naturally shared.
Cases like Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon provided comfortable
precedent to support the expansion of the equitable apportionment
doctrine to groundwater. Such an expansion was consistent with the
principles of equitable apportionment set out in Kansas v. Colorado—
like the fish, the groundwater is an interstate resource, and actions
undertaken in one state affect the availability of the resource in
another.185 And despite Tennessee’s use of newer technology to pump
water, Tennessee’s pumping practice was unlikely to violate the
you’re saying it’s irrelevant whether it’s an interstate water or not? MR. COGHLAN: That’s
correct.”).
182. Mississippi Brief in Support of Exceptions, supra note 83, at 36. (“Mississippi’s
Complaint is not that Defendants are taking too much water from Mississippi, it is that
Defendants have no right under the United States Constitution to take any groundwater located
in Mississippi, to change the natural hydrogeologic conditions in Mississippi, or to materially
diminish or damage the groundwater system underlying Mississippi to the detriment of
Mississippi’s citizens.”)
183. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (“Equitable apportionment is the
doctrine of federal common law that governs the disputes between States concerning their rights
to use the water of an interstate stream.”).
184. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 145, at 42. Justice Kagan here pushes for a
distinction to be made between this case and a case where technology can reach water that has no
natural flow. Id.
185. See Brief for the United States Regarding Special Master, supra note 5, at 15.
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“agency of natural law” or alter the legal analysis. In State of
Connecticut v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the law of equitable
apportionment was applied even though the diversion changed both
the speed and direction of the water flow.186 Mississippi was unlikely to
prevail on a theory that the groundwater is unnaturally shared when
prior case law has upheld the doctrine of equitable apportionment in
circumstances with even more drastic alteration of the natural
conditions.187
Furthermore, Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist., Mississippi’s most
important case for supporting its equal footing argument, was readily
distinguishable from the current case. Tarrant is unlike the current case
because Tennessee is accessing the groundwater within its own
boundaries while Texas sought to physically enter Oklahoma to obtain
water.188 The proper analogy to this case would be if Tennessee was
drilling at such an angle so that its wells were physically located
underneath Mississippi. Although states have authority over natural
resources within its borders, it cannot “preserve solely for its own
inhabitants’ natural resources located within its borders.”189 Thus, when
dealing with an interstate water source, the Court has held that the state
in which it originates should be “essentially irrelevant.”190
Following its past precedent and application of the federal common
law, the Court was correct in applying equitable apportionment as the
proper remedy. Several law professors filed an amicus brief with the
Court, opposing Mississippi’s ownership claims but also proposing an
alternative remedy under nuisance law. 191 The Court was right to reject
186. Id. at 665–66.
187. See Report of the Special Master, supra note 43, at 28. (“Pumping groundwater is no
different. It affects another state through the operation of natural laws.”).
188. See id. at 30.
189. Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. at 1025 (citing Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617, 627 (1978)).
190. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 323 (1984).
191. The professors believed that nuisance law can provide a basis for remedies in lieu of
equitable apportionment. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Defendants at 2,
Mississippi v. Tennessee, 135 S. Ct. 2916 (2015) (mem.) (No. 143, Original). The professors noted
that this avoids the task of “quantifying the available water supply” and instead measures the
harms of the water use. This approach would be better for the conservation of water, as the
professors worried equitable apportionment can still lead to total consumption. Id. at 18–19.
While the professors have proposed an interesting alternative doctrine, the Court was unlikely to
adopt interstate nuisance law for interstate water disputes. Applying nuisance law here would
require making a legal distinction between ground water and surface water which appears
scientifically tenuous. Moreover, it would replace a doctrine that has been widely used in water
disputes with a doctrine that has typically been used in pollution litigation and where it may be
more difficult to calculate exact harms than in pollution style cases. See Huffman, supra note 44,
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this alternative remedy under nuisance law because practical
implementation would be difficult. Given the flexibility of the
equitable apportionment doctrine, the Court can address the issues
raised by the professors in future cases where relevant, and potentially
apportion water resources in such a way that prevents the parties from
using the entire resource.
CONCLUSION
Equitable apportionment is designed to serve as a fair remedy
among equal states. By applying equitable apportionments’ flexible
approach to the facts and circumstances of this dispute, the Supreme
Court properly wielded a powerful tool to distribute a shared resource
to the states. Because the United States is composed of 50 equal
partners, it is critical that systems are implemented to incentivize
cooperative management of shared resources. Thus, there are practical
reasons to extend the doctrine of equitable apportionment to apply to
groundwater disputes.
If the Court’s decision had favored Mississippi, it would have
created uncertainty regarding shared natural resources and risked
increasing tensions between neighboring states. Furthermore, states
would likely have moved to hoard resources located inside their
geographical boundaries, potentially creating a “tragedy of the
commons” dilemma. Given the increasing scarcity of resources like
water, it is critical that states work together to manage their shared
resources for the good of their citizens.192 To that end, the doctrine of
equitable apportionment provides a tool to manage shared resources
in a responsible way. The Court correctly dismissed Mississippi’s
Complaint.

at 279–80 (discussing the potential inapplicability of nuisance law to ground water cases and
explaining that nuisance law is “generally restricted to action related to pollution”).
192. Clark, supra note 24, at 17 (reporting that declining groundwater levels are threatening
the efficiency and production of irrigation wells in Mississippi and that projects to divert surfacewater are being considered to “alleviate the stress” on the Aquifer).

